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Introduction 
In August 2001, the Water Commissioner was tasked by 
the Scottish Executive to carry out a strategic review of 
water charges covering the years 2002-06. Based on 
revenue calculations made by the Water Commissioner in 
his review, Scottish Water issued its water charges for 
2003-04. Since then there have been repeated arguments 
and complaints, particularly from businesses, that the 
prices charged are too high and are crippling business. For 
example, Peter Jones, writing in the Economist 29th May 
2003, cited the example of the BP refinery at Grangemouth, 
where the annual water bill is now £12.7 million, as 
against £7 million for a similar establishment in England. 
 
This article examines the impact which the then newly 
introduced system of expenditure control based on 
Resource Accounting and Budgeting, (RAB), had on the 
Strategic Review. We conclude that there appear to have 
been mistakes in the application of the RAB system at the 
time of the Strategic Review, which mean that the review 
took an unduly pessimistic view of the water industry’s 
financial position. This implies that the charges set as a 
result of the review were potentially too high by a 
significant amount. There is a requirement to re-open key 
aspects of the arithmetic of the Strategic Review: in 
particular, on how the Scottish Executive set the original 
RAB limits and how these were then translated into the 
Commissioner’s advice. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly 
sets the background. The main content of the paper is in 
section 3, where we examine how the Water Commissioner 
used the information given by the Scottish Executive with 
regard to RAB to determine how much Scottish Water could 
borrow, and we compare this with the figures the Scottish 
Executive itself produced for net borrowing. There is clear 
evidence of inconsistency between the Commissioner and 
the Scottish Executive, with the Commissioner producing in 
his calculations a much more pessimistic view than the 
Scottish Executive of the amount of net borrowing 
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consistent with a given RAB control limit. The implications 
of this for the charging decisions taking during the review 
are potentially profound and may amount to more than 
£100 million per annum. 
 
We cannot establish categorically, on the basis of the 
available evidence, how this inconsistency arose: but it 
appears to relate either to revised estimates of depreciation 
which the Commissioner calculated during his review, or 
more probably, to the possibility that there is a mistake in 
the terms of the letter from the Scottish Executive 
commissioning the review of charges which has meant that 
a substantial element of investment has effectively been 
double counted. 
 
Section 4 identifies, and discusses briefly, a number of 
other issues which are relevant to the determination of 
water charges. The section concludes with the 
recommendations that (a) the arithmetic on the setting of 
existing charges should be re-opened, and (b), that there 
should be a more wide ranging review of charging policy. 
 
 
Background 
Up until 1996, the water industry in Scotland was the 
responsibility of the Regional and Islands’ councils, with 
pricing policy being a matter for each Council within 
government policies on service, investment and borrowing. 
From 1996 until 2002, the industry was run by North, East 
and West water authorities: these authorities were merged 
in April 2002 on the formation of Scottish Water. 
 
Since 1999, a fundamental role in determining charging 
policy for water has been played by the Water 
Commissioner for Scotland. Acting within parameters set 
by Scottish Ministers, the Commissioner conducts periodic 
reviews, to produce advice for Ministers on the charging 
policies which the industry should adopt. The most recent 
such review was commissioned by Ministers in August 
2001, (reference Commissioning letter 21st August 2001), 
and related to charging schemes for the period 2002-03 to 
2005-06. Among matters which the Minister asked the 
Commissioner to take into account in his review were 
 
a. the implications of the planned merger of the three 
water boards; 
 
b. the required environmental and water quality targets; 
 
c.    the intention to completely harmonise charges for 
domestic water users across the whole of Scotland by 
2005-06; 
 
d.    the implications of a new system of public expenditure 
control on the water industry, based on RAB, which had 
come into effect in April 2001. 
 
The Commissioner conducted his review in Autumn 2001 
and published his conclusions in November 2001. 
(Strategic Review of Charges). As well as the harmonisation 
of domestic water charges, the Commissioner also advised 
that non-domestic charges should be harmonised across 
Scotland. The Commissioner’s advice was accepted by 
Ministers and underlay the new charges which were 
introduced from 2002-03. 
 
 
The implications of the introduction of resource 
accounting and budgeting 
Up to and including the year 2000-01, the government’s 
main financial control on the water industry was through 
setting a cash limit on annual new borrowing. The 
industry’s only sources of finance to cover its expenditures 
are revenue and new borrowing: thus, the amount the 
industry has to borrow is the difference between what the 
industry spends and what it gets in as new revenue. In any 
given year, the industry spends money on operating 
expenditure, (that is, current expenditures in running the 
service, including any PFI charges); investment, (in other 
words, all expenditure on creating fixed assets, that is, 
gross investment); and payment of interest on outstanding 
debt. Net borrowing is then essentially given by the 
formula: 
 
 
 
Table 1: Financial limits: £ million, cash terms  
 
Year 
 
98/99 
 
99/00 
 
00/01 
 
01/02 
 
02/03 
 
03/04 
 
04/05 
 
05/06 
 
Borrowing Consents (1) 
 
202.3 
 
221.9 
 
209 
 
223.4     
Implicit Borrowing Limits (2) 
Sc. Exec. Borrowing figures (3) 
Sc. Exec. Borrowing Consents (4) 
   
216 (a) 
229 
256 (b) 
199.4 
277 (b) 
163.7 
260 (b) 
249.7 
83.5 
 
190.8 
67.8 
 
195.8 
 
(1)  Investing in You, 2000, Table 7.13 
(2)  Derived from section 7, Chapter 32, Strategic Charges Review, November 2001 
(3)  Scottish Executive Data: (a) The Scottish Budget,  pub.2001;  (b) The Scottish Budget, pub.2002; 
(4)  Actual Borrowing Consents, The Draf t Scottish Budget 2003-04. 
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Net Borrowing = Operating Expenditures + Investment + 
Interest - Revenue .................................................................... (1) 
 
The first line of Table 1 gives the net borrowing limits as 
set by the government up to 2001-02. (The derivation of the 
figures in the later lines of Table 1 is explained below.) 
 
In April 2001, the government changed its control over the 
financing of the water industr y, in line with its general 
introduction of resource accounting and budgeting (RAB)1. 
The rationale of RAB was to move to a more accruals based 
system, (that is, recording expenditure as it is incurred, not 
when it is paid out), and to recognise the non-cash costs of 
government activity - e.g., the using up of capital 
(depreciation) even though this might not be matched by 
any actual financial payment in the year.  Another non-cash 
element covered in resource accounting is a charge 
relating to the cost of capital, that is, the cost of holding 
assets, which was initially assessed at 6.5 per cent of net 
assets. By bringing in these non-cash items relating to 
assets, the government hoped to improve 
overall management of the asset base: this was one of the 
main differences from the previous method of cash 
accounting. 
 
For the water industry in Scotland, the government replaced 
the former borrowing limit by a control measure based on 
RAB: the RAB control limit. The values of the RAB control 
limit, plus detailed notes on its definition, were set out in 
the Commissioning letter of August 2001. 
From Tables 32.1 to 32.6 of the Strategic Review, it can be 
deduced that the measure of RAB expenditure which the 
Water Commissioner counted against the RAB limit given 
to him by the Scottish Executive, was effectively: 
 
RAB expenditure = Operating Expenditures + Investment + 
Depreciation + Capital Charge Element - Revenue ............. (2) 
 
(To satisfy the RAB controls, RAB expenditure has to be no 
greater than the RAB control limit as set by the Scottish 
Executive). 
 
In this formula, the definitions of operating expenditure, 
investment and revenue are the same as in formula (1) 
above. The definition of depreciation is the total 
depreciation charge on both infrastructure and non- 
infrastructure elements of the system and includes actual 
expenditure (e.g., on replacement of pipes), required to 
maintain the functionality of the infrastructure. The capital 
charge element is the increase in capital charge above the 
2003-04 level, where the capital charge represents the 
need of the industry, under RAB, to generate a return of 
6.5% on its asset base. 
 
We stress that formula (2) is, apart from minor items like 
the effect of working capital, the definition of RAB 
expenditure which underpins the Strategic Review. We shall 
return later to the question of how sensible this formula is, 
particularly in its treatment of investment and 
depreciation. 
 
 
1. See HM Treasury website for general principles on RAB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The relationship between the RAB control limit and net borrowing in the Strategic Review: £ million 
 
 
Year 
 
01/02 
 
02/03 
 
03/04 
 
04/05 
 
05/06 
 
RAB Control Limit (Table 32.6) 
 
302.3 
 
314.3 
 
299.7 
 
299.7 
 
299.7 
less planned margin (Table 32.6) -9.4 49.2 61.3 37.1 73.5 
= RAB expenditure (Table 32.6) 311.7 265.1 238.4 262.6 226.2 
less depreciation (Table 32.6) 260.4 260.5 285 356.8 364.7 
less capital element (Table 32.6) 0 0 0 11.3 21.1 
plus  interest (Table 32.5) 142.7 150.6 153.8 154.9 152.9 
plus working capital (Table 32.4) 44.4 -5.0 -4.9 -3.1 0.9 
= New Borrowing 238.4 150.2 102.3 46.3 -5.8 
 
Line 1 gives the RAB control limits as set by the Scottish Executive. 
Line 2 is the margin which the Commissioner built in to allow for flexibility in the face of, for example, unexpected shocks. 
Line 3 gives the resulting RAB expenditure forecast to which the Water Commissioner was working. 
Line 4 shows the total depreciation. 
Line 5 shows capital charge movements, which only became relevant in 2004-05. 
Line 6 shows interest payments to be made by Scottish Water on outstanding loans 
Line 7 corrects for movements in working capital. 
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From a comparison of formulae (1) and (2), it follows that 
 
Net Borrowing = RAB expenditure - Depreciation - Capital 
Charge element + Interest ...................................................... (3) 
 
So, if we know what the RAB expenditure is, it is possible to 
work back, by subtracting depreciation and the capital 
charge element, and adding in interest payments, to the 
figure for net borrowing required. 
 
The Strategic Review of Charges shows calculations by the 
Water Commissioner,  linking new borrowing and the 
corresponding RAB expenditures, for years 2001-02 to 
2005-06.  Table 2, which is based entirely on figures from 
Tables 32.4, 32.5, and 32.6 in the Strategic Review, shows 
the reconciliation between the RAB control limit, (the 
maximum limit on RAB expenditures) and net borrowing as 
assessed in the Strategic Review. 
 
The derived figure for new borrowing in the final row of this 
table exactly equals, (apart from a maximum difference of 
0.1 for rounding), the new debt figure in Table 32.4 of the 
Review. 
 
Given the Commissioner’s figures on depreciation, capital 
charge element, interest and working capital, then the 
maximum amount of new borrowing possible under the RAB 
control limit would be the sum of the lines for new 
borrowing and planned margin in the above table. It is this 
sum which is shown as the implicit limit on borrowing in 
line 2 of Table 1 above. 
 
Finally, the Scottish Executive itself publishes each year the 
financial control totals which it sets for the water industry. 
In 2001 and 2002, the control totals were on the new RAB 
basis. At the same time, the Scottish Executive published 
the figures for new borrowing which it calculated were 
consistent with the RAB controls: however, no detail was 
published on how these figures were derived. These 
borrowing figures are shown for 00/01 to 03/04 in line 3 of 
Table 1. In its budget for 2003, the Scottish Executive 
abandoned the RAB control total for water, and went back 
to setting a control total directly in terms of new borrowing. 
These figures for 2003-04 onwards are shown in the final 
line of Table 1. 
 
To summarise, therefore, Table 1 shows, in its first line, 
borrowing control limits before the introduction of RAB; in 
its second line, the borrowing control limits implicit in the 
financial modelling undertaken by the Water Commissioner 
for the purposes of his strategic review, consistent with the 
RAB limits set by the government; and finally, the figures 
published later by the Scottish Executive as their view of the 
borrowing levels consistent with their expenditure controls. 
 
The contrast between line 2 and lines 3 and 4 is very 
striking. For example, in 2003-04, the figure in line 2 is 
almost £100 million less than that in line 3: and in each of 
the next two years, the difference between line 2 and line 4 
is over £100 million as the discussion in the next 
paragraph makes clear this is a genuine inconsistency, and 
not an artefact of comparing figures from different 
documents. 
 
To put this another way: when the Water Commissioner was 
carrying out his strategic review on charges, he was 
implicitly taking the view that the expenditure controls 
exercised by the Scottish Executive were imposing a very 
tight squeeze on the funding of the water industry - 
reducing the annual borrowing ceiling from £229 million in 
2001-02 to £67.8 million in 2005-06. This contrasts 
sharply with the figures published later by the Scottish 
Executive which indicate that, over the same period, the 
annual borrowing ceiling would start at a higher figure of 
£256 million and reduce only to £195.8 million, implying a 
very much milder financial squeeze. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison between Strategic Review and Scottish Executive view on relationship between RAB control and net borrowing: 
£million 
 
 
Strategic Review 
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
RAB Control Limit 302.3 314.3 299.7 
Implicit Borrowing Limit 229 199.4 163.7 
 
Scottish Executive AER 
Resource Budget -159.2 -159.7 -178.3 
plus Capital Budget 461.5 462 478 
= RAB Control Limit* 302.3 302.3 299.7 
Net New Borrowing 256 277 260 
 
 
 
* This figure is not published as such in the Annual Expenditure Repor t, but the figure for 2003-04 appears in the commissioning letter, and that for 
2002-03  is only £12 m less than that in the commissioning letter. 
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The contrast between the Commissioner’s figures and the 
Scottish Executive’s figures in table 1 is hugely significant 
from the point of view of the charging decisions made 
during the review. How could it have arisen that the 
Commissioner, at the time of the review, was taking a view 
about the maximum availability of funding to the water 
industry through net borrowing which was, by the end of the 
review period, some £130 million more adverse than 
figures which the Scottish Executive published later in its 
Annual Expenditure Report? There is strong evidence that 
what underlies this apparent inconsistency is that the 
Scottish Executive and the Commissioner take different 
views on how the RAB control limit relates to net borrowing. 
Overwhelming evidence for this is shown in Table 3 below. 
The first two lines in this table are repeated from Table 2 
and Table 1 above. The bottom four lines are derived from 
the Scottish Executive’s Annual Expenditure Report (AER) 
for 2003-04 published in April 2002. 
 
It is not possible to extend this table into later years 
because the Scottish Executive had abandoned RAB control 
for later years. But it is clear for this period, for which a 
direct comparison is possible, that the Scottish Executive 
were assessing a different relationship between net 
borrowing and the RAB limit than the Commissioner had 
done while he was conducting his review. We do know that 
part of the difference is due to different assumptions on 
interest charges: (the interest payments assumed by the 
Scottish Executive exceeded those assumed by the 
Commissioner by -£11.7 million, +£6.4 m., and +£26.2 m. 
in the three years in question). But these differences in 
interest charges are relatively small compared to the 
differences in overall net borrowing, starting from RAB 
limits which are virtually identical. 
 
Unfortunately, other than interest payments, the Scottish 
Executive does not publish the required detail which would 
enable their RAB and net borrowing figures in Table 3 to be 
fur ther reconciled. It seems clear, however, going back to 
the reconciliation of the Commissioner’s figures in Table 2 
above that the only other element which could account for 
the discrepancy between the Commissioner and the 
Scottish Executive relates to the handling of depreciation: 
(the only other candidate is working capital, which is small). 
 
There are two possible explanations which could account 
for depreciation having a differential impact in the Scottish 
Executive and Commissioner’s assessments. 
 
The first possibility is that the Commissioner simply used a 
different assessment of depreciation from that used by the 
Scottish Executive. We do know, from the Strategic Review, 
that the Commissioner did revise his assessment of 
depreciation during the conduct of the Review, both by 
revaluing the asset base at current prices, and by adopting 
more prudent depreciation and infrastructure renewal 
models. The Commissioner notes that both these factors 
had the effect of increasing his estimates of depreciation: 
(see Section 7, Chapter 32 of Strategic Review). Such a 
revision could account for the Commissioner’s estimates of 
depreciation being higher than the estimates available 
when the original RAB limit was set. However: 
 
(a)   the Scottish Executive figures quoted in Table 3 were 
produced after the Strategic Review. If the 
Commissioner had significantly revised upwards 
depreciation for the water industr y, why had the 
Scottish Executive not taken these estimates on board 
in producing their later figures? 
 
(b)   if the Commissioner did revise his estimates of 
depreciation significantly up, why was consideration 
not given to revising the new RAB control limits up, 
rather than squeezing the borrowing finance available 
to Scottish water down? After all, when the Treasury 
introduced the new RAB system of control in 2000, it 
was specifically stated that non-cash costs like 
depreciation would, for a trial period, be included in 
Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) rather than in the 
DEL: that is, such elements would not count directly 
against cash limits for an initial period, and leeway 
should therefore have been available for revisions. To 
quote from Treasury advice on RAB from the Treasury 
website. 
 
“Under a transitional resource budgeting regime 
introduced in the 2000 Spending Review, the non-cash 
costs introduced by resource accounting and 
budgeting, (cost of capital charges, depreciation and 
impairments, and accounting based provisions to meet 
future expenditure) were included in AME rather than 
DEL. This decision was taken in order to allow 
departments to gain more experience in monitoring 
and forecasting these items following their inclusion 
in budgets. These items were moved into DEL in the 
2002 Spending Review.” 
 
In the light of this Treasury advice, which was in force when 
the commissioning  letter was issued in August 2001, it 
appears to us that there should have been scope to adjust 
the new RAB limit upwards if the Commissioner 
significantly increased his depreciation estimates. 
 
We also question why the commissioning  letter from the 
Scottish Executive refers to the RAB control for the water 
industry as setting “absolute limits” - even though they 
incorporate a depreciation element which, on the basis of 
the Treasury advice, should have been in AME. 
 
Whether or not different depreciation figures were used, 
(and the position certainly needs to be clarified), there is a 
second hypothesis. This hypothesis is, that there is a 
mistake in the relationship which the Commissioner has 
used for relating the RAB control limit to net borrowing: 
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that is, that there is a mistake in the logic underlying  the 
reconciliation of the RAB limit and net borrowing given in 
Table 2. 
 
Consider formula 2 above, which shows the formula for RAB 
expenditure which was effectively used by the Commissioner 
in carrying out his review. In this formula, investment is 
gross, that is it includes expenditure on infrastructure 
renewals. The depreciation used in the formula also 
includes expenditure on infrastructure renewals. This 
means that formula 2 counts expenditure on infrastructure 
renewals twice. Because of this double counting, therefore, 
formula 2 actually overstates the use 
of resources by the water industry, to the extent of actual 
expenditure on renewal of infrastructure. A “correct” 
version of formula 2, which truly represented the 
organisation’s usage of resources would be given by 
replacing gross investment in formula 2 by investment net 
of infrastructure renewals. 
 
Subtracting formula 1 from this amended version of 
formula 2 would give the following relationship between net 
borrowing and RAB expenditure: 
 
Net Borrowing = RAB expenditure - Depreciation - Capital 
Charge element + Interest + Infrastructure renewal 
expenditure ................................................................................ (4) 
 
If, effectively, the Commissioner has been using formula 
(3), while the Scottish Executive were using formula (4) in 
preparing their annual expenditure report, then this could 
explain how the two parties are taking a consistently 
different view of the relationship between RAB and net 
borrowing and how the Commissioner has taken a much 
more pessimistic view of the net borrowing implications of 
a given RAB limit. 
 
Just as with the first hypothesis, however, there are some 
very puzzling features about this second hypothesis: - 
 
(a)   If the Commissioner and the Scottish Executive were 
using different formulae, this would imply a surprising 
lack of co-ordination between these bodies. 
 
(b)   Secondly, the approach used by the Commissioner is in 
effect determined by the terms of the commissioning 
letter from the Scottish Executive. This specifies, for 
example, that for 2003-04, the RAB control on the 
water industry is that the industry’s capital budget 
should be less than £299.7 plus profit: where the 
capital budget is specified in terms of gross capital 
expenditure and where profit is as calculated in the 
water industry published accounts. In the water 
industry published accounts, profit is calculated after 
deducting full depreciation, which includes 
infrastructure renewal. This effectively determines that 
the RAB measure used by the Commissioner must be 
defined as in formula (2). 
If the second hypothesis held, therefore, this would imply 
that the advice in the commissioning  letter from the 
Scottish Executive is inconsistent with the principles used 
by the Scottish Executive in compiling their 2003-04 
annual expenditure report. What does seem clear, however, 
is that the commissioning letter involves a definition of 
RAB which overstates the true use of resources by the water 
industry. 
We are therefore left in the unsatisfactory position that: 
(a)   there is clear evidence that the Commissioner 
assumed a much more pessimistic relationship than 
the Scottish Executive about the net borrowing 
consequences of a given RAB limit. 
 
(b)   both of our possible hypotheses to account for this 
embody puzzling features: although we do not have the 
evidence to say which is correct, there does not seem 
to be any other plausible explanation for the observed 
inconsistencies. 
 
(c)   however, if either, or both, hypothesis is correct, then 
the charging decisions taken during the review were 
taken against the background of a misleadingly 
negative assessment of the net borrowing which would 
actually be available to the water industr y. If hypothesis 
1 holds, then, under the Treasury guidance then 
current, changes in depreciation should not have 
counted against a rigid control limit. If hypothesis 2 
holds, then the net borrowing possible under the 
Strategic Review should have been recalculated using 
the corrected formula (4), leading to net borrowing 
figures much closer to those produced by the Scottish 
Executive. 
 
We conclude that there is now a clear requirement to re- 
open the arithmetic of how the Scottish Executive set the 
RAB limits in the commissioning  letter and how these were 
then used by the Commissioner. The inconsistency 
between the Scottish Executive and the Commissioner on 
the level of net borrowing consistent with a given RAB 
control limit must be resolved. The implication of the 
conclusion at paragraph 3.12(c) above is that, whatever the 
explanation for this inconsistency, the borrowing figures in 
the Strategic Review were probably too low, (and the 
revenue caps correspondingly too high). For the borrowing 
figures, the amount in question in each of the later years of 
the review period is well in excess of £100 million: (and 
this could approach £200 million if a less conservative view 
were also taken about the need for the planned flexibility 
margin which the Commissioner built into his calculations). 
 
If it turns out that the borrowing figures used in the 
Strategic Review are indeed substantially too low, then this 
raises further questions which it would be for Ministers to 
consider. Namely, would they have taken the same charging 
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decisions on the basis of the advice given in the Strategic 
Review if they had known that there was substantial 
additional borrowing headroom available to the water 
industry within the overall RAB limits. Furthermore,  will they 
re-open their decisions, particularly now that the damaging 
consequences of high water charges for Scottish industry 
are becoming clear? 
 
 
Other issues, and recommendations 
The implication of what we have argued is that charging 
decisions will need to be re-opened. In doing that, other 
important issues need to be taken into account as well, 
some of which relate back to questionable decisions taken 
during the 2001 Strategic Review. Overall, the issues which 
need to be covered include: redressing the problems caused 
by the harmonisation of business rates; ensuring an 
appropriate balance between fixed and variable charges; 
addressing the need for flexibility in charging policy in the 
light of underspending on capital; ensuring that appropriate 
policies are operating on effluent charges; and impor tantly, 
ensuring that mechanisms are in place which will give an 
incentive rather than a disincentive towards achieving 
improved efficiency. At the same time, any review needs to 
take account of the wider objective of utilising to the full 
the potential of Scotland’s water resources as a source of 
competitive advantage both to indigenous businesses and 
for attracting foreign direct investment. We now discuss 
each of these points in a little more detail. 
 
Harmonisation of business charges 
The decision to harmonise business charges was taken by 
the Commissioner in the course of the Strategic Review: the 
Commissioning letter to the Commissioner referred only to 
Ministers’ wish to harmonise domestic charges. It is very 
doubtful whether the complete of harmonisation of 
business charges is desirable, for the following reasons. 
 
(a)   If business charges are harmonised then there is no 
incentive for business to locate in areas where supply 
and/or treatment is cheapest. There will therefore be a 
sub-optimal location of industry. 
 
(b)   As some units locate in high cost areas there will 
inevitably be an increase in the average cost of 
provision of water services; hence affecting the 
profitability of industry in Scotland. 
 
(c)   The policy will also inevitably sterilise one of 
Scotland’s premier potential comparative advantages, 
namely the ability to attract high water-use industries 
to low cost locations. 
 
Fixed charges 
The paper by Sawkins and Dickie (2003) makes clear how 
high the fixed cost burden is in Scotland relative to 
England. A high fixed cost regime like this is potentially 
severely damaging. One effect is that small users pay 
particularly high average charges per unit of water 
consumed. This results in an entry barrier to setting up in 
business, damaging the economy precisely where we are 
wanting it to be stimulated. Second, a high fixed charge 
system combined with low unit cost provides no incentive 
for economies in the use of water: this leads to the 
inefficient use of water and ultimately to higher 
expenditure. 
 
Flexibility in light of underspend 
Past performance of the Water Boards shows that capital 
programmes are likely to be underspent in any given year. 
In determining charges from year to year, any underspend 
should be taken into account, so that the customer can 
potentially benefit from reduced charges, rather than, say, 
the industry having a financial cushion which it can use to 
suppor t existing inefficiency. There therefore needs to be a 
readiness, which seems to be lacking at present, to adjust 
charges pragmatically from year to year, and not just at the 
periodic Strategic Reviews. 
 
The Mogden Formula 
The Mogden formula is the basis for trade effluent charges 
throughout the UK, (Sawkins and Dickie). The charge to the 
firms reflects both the volume and quality aspects of that 
firm’s trade effluent in the calculation of its final charge. 
Now that firms are subject to EU water directives and 
paying for substantial improvements in their effluent, there 
is a need to ensure that the Mogden formula adequately 
reflects the reduced costs of dealing with semi-treated 
effluent, otherwise there is a danger that some firms will be 
paying twice over for effluent treatment. 
 
Efficiency 
It seems clear from the investigations undertaken by the 
Commissioner that there is a significantly higher level of 
inefficiency in the water industry in Scotland compared to 
that in English water companies. There are however a 
number of difficult issues surrounding the question of 
efficiency. First of all, how robust are the Commissioner’s 
estimates of the efficiency savings possible? Secondly, how 
best can adequate incentives be built into the charging and 
funding arrangements to ensure efficiency targets are 
met? In this context it is worth remembering that the 
effects of the last Strategic Review were possibly quite 
perverse: high charges were set on the basis of low 
borrowing potential whereas in the event higher borrowing 
potential materialised: the financial cushion which this 
represented would have acted as a positive disincentive to 
the achievement of efficiency gains. 
 
 
Recommendations 
In the light of the above, our two principal 
recommendations are: 
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a) The arithmetic of the Strategic Review, carried out in 
2001, should be re-opened to resolve the inconsistency 
between the Commissioner and the Scottish Executive 
on the level of borrowing which was consistent with the 
given RAB control limit. 
 
b)    There should be a review of water charges, (as also 
recommended by Sawkins and Dickie), taking into 
account the conclusions arising from (a), and also 
addressing the other issues raised in this section. 
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